But CyT did not follow the conventional path for managing large-scale strategic change.
Executives did not articulate a crisis or launch a strategic audit of market trends or competitive threats; and the company made no attempt to revolutionize its market strategy or business model. Instead, executives turned their attention to a small number of ordinary business activities such as procuring inputs, managing customer relationships, and developing people.
Then, leveraging stakeholder relationships, internet technologies, and social media, the company commissioned a new system for monitoring capabilities in fundamental activities for CyT and its competitors. From this platform, executives developed improved systems for goal-setting, measurement, and allocating resources to the everyday fundamentals of business success. This renewed commitment to mastering and executing the fundamentals of business success -supported by empirical data, internet technologies, and new analytical methods -transformed strategy-making at CyT. By deliberately shifting management attention from the traditional abstractions of "big strategy" to the daily realities of fundamental business practice, CyT executives generated a powerful body of longitudinal data for sensing market shifts, tracking competitive activity, setting priorities for investment, and defining new strategic initiatives.
According to one CyT executive, the shift was "a complete game-changer. Without question, it revolutionized the way we think about strategy." The magnitude of the signal is faint but its outlines are clear. Executives no longer believe in sustainable competitive advantage as a concept. They have little patience for impressive platitudes or drawn-out strategy talk. They attend relentlessly to what they can control, while rejecting the notion that strategy and operational excellence, or strategy formation and execution, are separable things. They rely more on measurement and evidence, and less on opinions and persuasion. They view strategy as a continuous process involving decisions and actions, not as a periodic process involving only decisions. They value hard data and quantification but also This paper describes the principles of diligence-based strategy and provides a method for putting these ideas into practice. It draws theoretical inspiration from cognitive psychology and behavioral research, while rejecting the rationality and efficiency assumptions that entered the theory and practice of strategic management through economics. Assuming that markets are comprised of human beings rather than rational economic agents, diligence-based strategy shows the consequences of bringing realistic assumptions about human behavior to the practice of strategic management.
THE CHESS SYNDROME
As practiced by large companies and taught in business schools, strategic management is largely an art or science of the intellect. Corporations and strategy consultancies employ sophisticated analytical tools for understanding markets and internal resources, and MBA students learn general theories and techniques for industry analysis, competitive positioning, and the internal analysis of the firm. The tools of strategic analysis are widely disseminated and embedded in the strategy processes of companies.
In using these tools, strategists are vulnerable to a state of mind that might be called the "chess syndrome": the belief that the purpose of strategy is to analyze and choose strategic moves. Through training and experience, business strategists learn to assess industry structures, recognize patterns in industry and competitive trends, evaluate a company's competitive position, develop and evaluate strategic options, judge probabilities and payoffs of future events, and choose the scale, scope, and competitive position of the firm. Because these tasks are cognitive and analytical, they suggest parallels between business strategy and other domains in which competitive positioning plays an essential role -most notably chess, in which the analysis of competitive moves is paramount.
5
The problem is that chess and business are very different games. Chess grandmasters like Magnus Carlsen and Garry Kasparov have extraordinary gifts for recognizing patterns and seeing Choosing a good chess move is intellectually complex but behaviorally trivial: when a decision is made the player reaches across the board and moves the piece to a new square. Implementation is swift and unproblematic, and unexpected events never get in the way. Chess players never think about strategy execution because chess strategies never fall apart between thinking and doing.
Ease of execution distinguishes chess from domains of human activity that require both thinking and doing, such as mountain climbing. In the past 60 years, mountain climbers have discovered 18 different routes up Mount Everest. Most of these routes have been tried more than once, and every experienced climber knows which ones offer the greatest probability of success. As it happens, 99% of climbers choose the Southeast Ridge from Nepal or the North
Ridge from Tibet. Statistics show that the Southeast Ridge yields slightly higher success rates and fewer deaths, but taking weather and other factors into account, many climbers prefer the North Ridge and the success rate there is reasonably high.
Unlike chessmasters, climbers of Mount Everest must consider strategy execution, both during the climb and while planning the climb. In chess there are 24 possible moves at the opening and 10.9 million possible positions by the seventh move. In climbing Everest there are only two feasible moves at the start and movement is continuous and effortful. The two feasible paths up the mountain are widely known, and climbers do not agonize over the choice of paths.
Indeed most climbers choose their paths implicitly before deciding whether to go on the expedition at all, knowing that the decision entails equifinality of choice (climbers can reach the top on either path), randomness (which may hinder or assist the climb), and continuous interaction with external forces (such as weather, sherpas, equipment, and other climbers).
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These characteristics radically alter the strategy process from beginning to end. 
BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS
Theories and concepts in strategic management bear the strong imprint of microeconomic theory. 10 Strategy theories share with economics the assumption that a company cannot beat its rivals by adopting widely available practices that are known to improve business performance.
Strategy theories assume that homogeneous companies perform homogeneously, so a company cannot win by imitating its competitors. It can try to do the same things better, but "strategy is not operational excellence": 11 if a company adopts a profit-making practice, its rivals -which are rational, observant, and open to new ideas -will copy the practice and the market will return to the zero-profit equilibrium. The only way a company can gain a performance edge is by building sustainable competitive advantages protected by barriers to imitation. 
A METHOD FOR DILIGENCE-BASED STRATEGY
This section describes a framework and method for diligence-based strategy. The method combines elements of the processes followed by companies like CyT and Mars, along with frameworks the author has developed independently over a period of years. This approach has been put into practice by companies in industries such as financial services, professional services and consumer goods, and is applicable to many others. It does not rely on assumptions specific to the profit sector, and has been employed in government and non-for-profit organizations, and in developed and emerging economies. The method will be described under five headings: (1) Activities, (2) Strategic Capital, (3) Priorities, (4) Dynamics, and (5) Measurement.
(1) Activities
In diligence-based strategy, the basic unit of analysis is the activity. An activity is something people do, like developing new services, communicating with suppliers, and processing insurance claims. When a company undertakes an activity, the activity becomes a receptacle for executive attention, capital investment, resource allocation, strategic initiatives, learning, capability and mastery. As something people do, an activity is observable, measurable, and manageable. It is not an intangible or unobservable asset, and it is not a "key success factor" or any other kind of "factor." An activity is both a noun and a verb, a kind of organizational gerund (a noun ending in -ing). As a noun, it is something we observe and measure; as a verb, it is a vehicle for getting things done: managing, learning, communicating and improving. Activities can always be expressed as -ing words, and this is how they are expressed in a diligence-based model.
Managers can choose their industries and strategies, and can partially determine what drives business success -for example, by choosing a particular business model. But every domain of human activity operates within a deep structure of competitive performance, a performance function that determines whether a participant succeeds or fails. 24 This function is not defined by participants but by the "rules of the game," which reward some activities and punish others.
Players do not observe this function directly, but discover it by experience, learning, and trial and error. People may construe the performance function differently (e.g., from a realist or interpretivist perspective), but the performance function is exogenous, serving as a hard constraint on enterprise performance.
25
The performance function is composed of fundamental activities: that is, the crucial activities that drive competitive success. By a process of hypothesis-testing and trial and error, executives discover which activities drive performance for the enterprise, the relative importance of these activities, and their responsiveness to different levels and types of investment.
26
To initiate diligence-based strategizing, executives should set initial goals or "anchor points"
for the organization. Typically, this involves identifying enterprise-level goals for growth, profitability, innovation, and market coverage, to be revisited later in the strategy process. To bridge these goals with fundamental activities, executives should also develop a definition of the enterprise -that is, a very short (and provisional) description of the nature and scope of the enterprise. From these two foundations -goals and a definition of the enterprise -executives can move forward with the diligence-based process. Fundamental activities must satisfy two criteria: (1) Mastery of the activities contributes significantly to organizational performance; and (2) Managers can allocate resources to the activities, measure them, and monitor outcomes. In applying these criteria, executives should not expect to find a large number of fundamental activities, and experience suggests that a "rule of five," give or take one or two, provides a good balance of breadth and depth for most enterprises (in later stages, the method introduces sub-activities that take the analysis to any desired level of detail). If a company has five fundamental activities, it is often the case that two or three have an external orientation (such as serving customers), and two or three take an internal view (such as managing internal culture).
The list of fundamental activities can include activities unique to the organization as well as generic-sounding activities that would drive success in any organization or sector. For example, generic-sounding activities may include:
-Serving customers -Developing new products (or services) -Improving brand recognition -Building external relationships -Benchmarking best practice -Managing the supply chain -Procuring inputs -Distributing products -Communicating -Developing our people -Managing technology -Managing internal systems and processes -Managing costs It should also be noted that diligence-based strategy can be applied at any unit of strategic analysis -for example, in a department, project, business-unit or corporate parent. In corporate strategy, highly diversified firms like GE and Tata Group have shown that it is possible, by Having identified a handful of fundamental activities, executives must then assess how these activities work together to drive business success. This constitutes the performance function of the enterprise. A company's capabilities in its fundamental activities work together according to the performance function -for example, by summation or multiplication -to create total strategic capital (TSC), which is the company's total capability in its fundamental activities.
For ease of exposition, consider an organization that has two fundamental activities, called
Making (M) and Selling (S). In naming M and S as fundamental activities, executives affirm that M and S work together to drive performance for the company. This has specific consequences for the strategy process: M and S will be treated as the company's primary strategic variables; executives will set goals for the mastery of M and S; the strategy process will determine resource allocations for M and S; and the company will commit itself to the continuous measurement, monitoring and management of M and S.
Diligence-based strategizing does not employ "box and arrow" models involving linear or circular systems of relationships among activities, as in value chain analysis or activity systems.
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These models can be useful, but the accurate ones have many boxes and feedback loops and can be difficult to use in practice. The simple ones are easy to use but offer fewer insights. The diligence-based method takes a different approach, focusing on the form of the performance function through which activities create total strategic capital for the enterprise.
In principle, fundamental activities could produce total strategic capital in many ways: for Multiplicative performance has large consequences for management practice. In the search for competitive advantage, most companies tend to over-invest in strengths and under-invest in weaknesses. They do this in the mistaken belief that competitive advantage comes from strengths instead of from the performance system as a whole. But this is almost never the case:
in a multiplicative performance system any source of competitive advantage can be nullified by weaknesses in other activities.
In diligence-based strategy, it is important for managers to gain an intuitive feel for multiplicative performance. This does not require a mathematical understanding, but rather an intuitive capacity for making resource allocation decisions in a multiplicative system. This is best seen in a numerical example, as in Figure 1 .
-INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE - Figure 1 shows two companies, Ruby and Indigo. On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 denotes no capability in an activity and 10 denotes complete mastery, Ruby rates 2 in Making and 8 in important to performance -then an additive performance function will produce the same total strategic capital for the two companies (2 + 8 = 6 + 4 = 10). In a weakest link function, Indigo will have more TSC (Indigo's S = 4; Ruby's M = 2); in a strongest link performance function, Ruby will have more TSC (S = 8); and in a multiplicative function, Indigo will have more TSC (6 x 4 = 24, compared with 2 x 8 = 16).
In the multiplicative performance function, Ruby should not allocate its next unit of resource to its strongest activity (Selling): a one unit capability improvement in Selling would improve Ruby's TSC from 16 (2 x 8) to 18 (2 x 9), whereas a one unit capability improvement in Making would improve Ruby's TSC from 16 (2 x 8) to 24 (3 x 8 = 24). Thus, the multiplicative system rewards balanced capabilities in a company's fundamental activities.
The "principle of balanced capabilities" can be hard to put into practice. People prefer to invest in the capabilities that made them successful in the first place, and organizational politics and cultural inertia make it hard for executives to invest away from current strengths. Executives are also susceptible to cognitive biases that promote continuity in investment decisions, such as the endowment effect, loss aversion, confirmation bias, and the "curse of knowledge." 31 By focusing on multiplicative performance, diligence-based strategy guides executives into a balanced consideration of the organization's portfolio of fundamental activities. Executives who gain an appreciation for multiplicative performance can avoid common behavioral biases and make better overall judgments in resource allocation.
(3) Priorities
Resource allocation decisions hinge on three factors: a company's capabilities in its fundamental activities; the relative strategic priorities of these activities; and the extent to which the activities yield capability improvements in response to new resource allocations. This is illustrated numerically in Appendix A, which shows the relative priorities of Making and Selling Using Heuristic 1, a company with two activities to which it has assigned equal priority (.5)
should allocate resources equally; if the priorities are .7 and .3, the company should allocate resources 70% to the former, 30% to the latter. Most of the time, this heuristic aligns with the intuitions of managers and is relatively easy to follow.
However, a company's capabilities can fall out of alignment with priorities, especially if the company does not measure or monitor its fundamental activities. In these circumstances, managers should not allocate resources according to priorities. Heuristic 2 says that managers should allocate above-normal resources to any activity that has fallen below its relative priority.
This was shown in Appendix A, where Ruby's relative capability in Making (2/10, or .20) had fallen short of its relative priority (.30). According to Heuristic 2, Ruby maximizes total strategic capital by allocating resources to Making, the activity with low capability in relation to its priority.
In practice, it is Heuristic 2 that presents the most difficulty for managers. Executive attention is naturally drawn to the salience of existing strengths and areas of high priority. But an -INSERT SIDEBAR ABOUT HEREThese conclusions assume that all activities yield the same capability improvements in response to resource allocations; in other words, that capability improvements can be achieved at the same cost for all activities. In practice, this is seldom the case: as companies improve their capabilities, further improvements tend to become costlier and more difficult to achieve at the margin. In learning and experience curves with a fixed upper limit (like a 0 to 10 scale), improving from 9 to 10 is harder than improving from 3 to 4. Thus, managers must consider the comparative responsiveness of fundamental activities to new resource investments at the margin.
This problem corresponds exactly to the standard economic problem of optimizing factors of production in the maximization of output. 33 However, managers do not need to perform these calculations. The essential point for managers is that the effect of "diminishing marginal improvements" makes it even more imperative that they attend carefully to weaknesses in fundamental activities: the existence of low-cost, unexploited learning opportunities means that 
(4) Dynamics
In determining resource allocations, managers should look for discrepancies between the priority of activities and existing capabilities. If relative priorities and capabilities are aligned, then Heuristic 1 applies and the company can allocate resources in proportion to priority (adjusted for costs). If not, as in Table 1 , managers should examine the magnitudes of any discrepancies and determine which activities are candidates for above-normal resource allocation. In Table 1 , capabilities are significantly lower than priorities for two activities -Developing Culture and
Building Relationships with Retailers -and also for Developing New Products. The method's emphasis on activities leads naturally to discussions of organizational boundaries: if the company has a chronic weakness that responds poorly to investment, the activity becomes a candidate for outsourcing; if the company excels in an activity that responds well to investment, managers can explore business models for maximizing its impacts; if rivals are launching new activities (such as building online communities for crowdsourcing), managers can consider reshaping the company's profile of activities.
-INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE -
The diligence-based method facilitates concrete, evidence-driven strategy conversations that connect market positions to the dynamic challenges of putting them into practice. It can be used in conjunction with a broad range of established techniques for analyzing options for strategic investment, including methods for alternative generation, probability and payoff estimation, decision making, and evaluation of uncertainty (such as scenario planning). 37 The method provides a strategic audit trail of capability improvement and an early-warning system for technological and market shifts. In practice, companies like CyT find that the benefits of 
(5) Measurement
Diligence-based strategy requires systems of activity measurement and performance management, along with management and communication practices for supporting these systems. These systems do not have to be costly or highly formalized, or developed all at once.
The culture and mission of some organizations will suggest a lighter touch, whereas other organizations may take a more robust approach. Whether the method is robust or light-touch, the crucial requirement is to place fundamental activities at the heart of organizational strategy.
To put a measurement system into place, managers should identify the component subactivities that form the basis for the organization's fundamental activities. Sub-activities supply the observability and specificity required for effective measurement. For example, the fundamental activity "developing new products" may be composed of sub-activities like researching new product technologies, seeking ideas from customers, developing product prototypes, and pilot-testing with customers. The activity "developing our people" may be composed of sub-activities like holding weekly meetings with employees, developing a career plan for each employee, involving people in strategy conversations, and linking individual goals to organizational outcomes. As with fundamental activities, five sub-activities seems to be a manageable number in practice (at CyT the number ranges from four to seven).
Sub-activities can be measured using the same numerical scales employed for fundamental activities. This enables managers to combine the capability ratings for sub-activities into a composite capability rating for the fundamental activity as a whole. Thus, for example, CyT uses ratings for four sub-activities -managing brand reputation, providing brand marketing support, creating innovative product packaging, and managing new product launches -to derive a 0 to 100 rating for the fundamental activity "supporting consumer marketing." To obtain these ratings, CyT works closely with external consultants to gather detailed feedback from external stakeholders. 40 For the activity "supporting consumer marketing," the most crucial and informed stakeholders are the five largest retail supermarkets in the UK through which CyT distributes its products. Using web-based surveys of multiple respondents in each retailer -supported by follow-up contacts by phone, Skype or face to face -CyT managers work with the consulting team to compile a detailed profile of CyT's capabilities for each subactivity. At the same time, the surveys produce comparative ratings for CyT's seven largest competitors, allowing managers to use comparative bar charts and other forms of analysis.
Retailers also receive feedback from the surveys, which improves data reliability and retailer response rates.
In diligence-based strategy, managers should use every available technology and data source to compile data on the company's activities. This varies by sector, and from one activity to another. For externally-facing activities, sources include quantitative data from online databases, a dedicated website for data gathering, web surveys, blogs, social media feeds, and data provided by consultancies and industry experts; for internally-facing activities, they include blogs,
anonymous surveys, open forums, and data obtained in performance appraisal systems; for activities related to efficiency or productivity, they include numerical data for input, output, and defect rates. Companies lacking a strong track record of customer or stakeholder engagement can use diligence-based strategy as the catalyst for launching new programs of technologyenabled communication with customers and suppliers.
An organization that has four sub-activities for each of five fundamental activities will collect data for 20 sub-activities. This is achievable for most organizations. For presentation, each fundamental activity is charted and these charts are supported by charts for each sub-activity.
This becomes the documentation for resource allocation and strategic decision making. At CyT each fundamental activity has its own chart, which gives the ratings for each sub-activity (like the horizontal bar chart in Figure 2 ). As supporting documentation, each sub-activity has a chart showing how the sub-activity was measured. These pages, along with summary charts and conclusions, constitute the playbook for diligence-based strategizing at CyT.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Diligence-based strategy offers a theoretically-grounded philosophy of strategic management, and an applied method for formulating and executing strategy in organizations. Drawing on psychology and behavioral strategy, the theory and method are founded on the premise that organizations achieve superior performance not by thinking about how to obtain competitive advantages, but by the thoughtful doing of activities fundamental to success.
Diligence-based strategy did not appear all at once, and is still in development. It is possible to argue from historical evidence that the most successful companies -from GE to Intel to Google -have always practiced diligence-based strategy, and that scholarly work in behavioral strategy has come very late to the game. The diligence-based approach works in The diligence-based approach does not reject traditional approaches to strategy, but urges managers to think carefully about how these methods are used. Economics-based methods neglect the human and behavioral realities of strategic management, and are poorly adapted to environments characterized by social complexity, political uncertainty, and economic inefficiency. In prioritizing the pursuit of competitive advantages, older methods focus executive attention on the pure cognition of goal setting, understanding industry structures, planning competitive positions, and analyzing resource advantages. By focusing executive attention on people and behavior, diligence-based strategy helps executives drive performance in human environments that reward diligence, perseverance, and a capacity for getting things done.
From an economic point of view, someone might ask: Is diligence-based strategy really strategy? Isn't strategy concerned with setting goals, choosing products, setting price and quality levels, deciding whether to enter markets, and making acquisition decisions? Isn't strategy "big"?
From a diligence-based perspective, strategy is what executives do to create successful outcomes, whatever this may entail. If success entails goal-setting and making big decisions, then this is what executive strategists should do. But in human markets characterized by equifinality of choice, randomness, and difficult and uncertain implementation, success tends to depend less on "big strategy" than on the relentless management of disciplined action.
The purpose of diligence-based strategy is to help managers develop and deliver effective strategies. It is not an operational or tactical program, a checklist of factors, or a boxes-andarrows system of transactions. Diligence-based strategy can equally promote market disruption or manufacturing productivity, market exploration or resource exploitation, radical innovation or systems efficiency. Ironically, many executives find that only by thinking "small" -focusing on business fundamentals rather than big strategic moves -can a company discover and enact the big moves traditionally associated with competitive strategy, such as developing new technologies and capturing market opportunities. If the method seems more operational than conventional strategy models, the problem may ultimately rest with conventional models.
Strategy is about creating successful outcomes, and it is possible that the old dogma that separated strategy from operations, and strategy formation from strategy execution, has outlived its usefulness in strategic management.
The diligence-based method is not tied to a particular industry or geography, or to the profit sector. It can be used in all organizations and in sub-units at all levels. It is adaptable to the pursuit of financial or non-financial goals. Technology-enabled measurement of fundamental activities provides a powerful guide and "nudge" to human performance in every domain of activity. The diligence-based approach facilitates strategy-making in business, sports and politics, We are grateful to an anonymous referee, who made the point that good and bad choices may not be symmetrical: choosing a good path does not guarantee success, but choosing a truly bad one (e.g., a hazardous path up Mount Everest) could guarantee disaster. 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 In the above article, Fay compares the process of human discovery to playing the board game Mastermind. In Mastermind, the player attempts to discover a pre-selected code consisting of four pegs of different colors, which are covered by a shield. On each turn, the player guesses the code and receives information about the correctness of guesses. Fay writes: "The cosmos consists of an unknown but causally operative structure which is objectively 'there'; science is the attempt to replicate this structure through a process of hypothesis formation and testing; and a true theory is one which exactly duplicates the pre-existing structure." (p. 36) F o r R e v i e w O n l y Both Fay and Karl Weick argued that people in the real world cannot be sure that the "underlying code" actually exists; or if it exists, whether people can discover it. Fay writes: "There isn't any One True Map of the earth, of human existence, of the universe, or of Ultimate Reality, a Map supposedly embedded inside these things; there are only maps we construct to make sense of the welter of our experience, and only us to judge whether these maps are worthwhile for us or not." (p. 38).
The diligence-based approach can accommodate either a realist interpretation ("there is a real underlying code") or a constructionist or "pragmatist" interpretation ("the underlying code is not objectively real, but constructed by people as an aid and analogy for problem-solving"). 26 Under equifinality of choice, industry landscapes allow more than one path to high performance. For example, a firm might achieve the same success using a strategy of (a) equallyweighted capabilities in distributing and marketing, or (b) unequally weighted capabilities in producing and serving customers. Diligence-based strategy assumes that executives can choose (a) or (b) as the company's strategy or business model (or they can choose others), and they can choose freely among all feasible allocations of resources. However, as in economic theory, executives cannot in the short run choose the extent to which any business model is rewarded by the environment. This is a feature of the environment, which decision makers must learn by allocating resources to activities and observing their effects.
In practice, the performance function is both uncertain (at any point in time) and potentially unstable (over time). Executives can reduce uncertainty by engaging in market search, gathering information from a variety of sources, and observing the effects of resource allocations (as described in the text). 32 How can managers know if their organization's performance function is multiplicative? The best way to evaluate the function is to ask: Would a capability reduction in one of our core activities reduce our effectiveness in other activities? Note that this is not the same as asking whether a capability reduction in a core activity would make the company worse off, to which the answer should be "yes" (if a manufacturer becomes less capable of procuring quality components, this will hurt the company even if the performance function is additive). But if the same decline hurts the company secondarily by reducing the effectiveness or efficiency of the manufacturing process (say, due to higher error rates), or makes the sales task more costly (due to lower product quality), or creates a ripple effect in customer service (due to reputational decline or higher warranty costs), then the system is multiplicative. This means that lower capability in one activity has negative spillover effects for other activities, reducing their effectiveness and multiplying through the performance system as a whole. In a similar way, an improved capability in one activity can have positive spillovers for other activities and positive multiplier effects for the performance system as a whole.
From a behavioral point of view, managers can ask: How effectively could we carry on our business without direct communication or coordination across core activities? Could our activities be conducted in a "stand-alone" or purely modular way? The multiplicative performance function assumes that core activities are not modular but complementary, requiring communication and behavioral coordination. The standard treatment for two variables in microeconomics is to represent relative input costs as a line overlaid on the map of production isoquants, with optimal production at the point of tangency (see Sidebar). These calculations can be performed algebraically for any number of activities. On the other hand, the diligence-based method does not require these kinds of mathematical calculations. The main point for managers is to appreciate that cost tradeoffs play a role in resource allocation decisions in a multiplicative system. 34 Scaling from 0 to 10 is not essential; CyT uses a scale from 0 to 100, and the minimum could be set at one rather than zero. 35 Quantitative analysis using the weighted multiplicative model, assuming equal costs of capability improvement for all activities, shows that one unit of added capability has the greatest impact on total strategic capital when applied to Developing Culture (TSC rises by .36), followed by Building Relationships with Retailers (+.27), Developing New Products (+.22), Improving Productivity (+.09), and Marketing to Consumers (+.06). 36 For example, if distributing products is a fundamental activity for Company A, and Company B introduces a more efficient system for distributing products, the "bar" for competitive mastery rises and Company A's relative capability declines. Thus, a company's capability can decline from 6/10 to 4/10 even if its absolute capability is unchanged; or its capability can remain the same despite absolute improvements in capability. This "red queen effect" requires executives to attend closely to the frontiers of capability mastery in its sector. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60   F  o  r  R  e  v  i  e  w  O  n  l  y 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 To produce a numerical index for TSC that follows the original 0 to 10 scale, all functions are averaged.
i Thus, the Additive function is the average of the two capabilities, and the Weighted Additive is the weighted average. Similarly, the Multiplicative function is the multiplicative average of the two capabilities (the "geometric mean"), and the Weighted Multiplicative is the weighted multiplicative average (the "weighted geometric mean").
ii Readers interested in the detailed calculations will find them in Table A1 .
Turning to the resource allocation decision, Table A2 examines the alternatives for Ruby, comparing the results for a one-unit increase of Ruby's capability in Making or Selling. Table A2 shows that if the performance function is Additive, it does not matter whether Ruby gains a oneunit capability in Making or Selling: the "New TSC" column shows that either will increase TSC to 5.50, an increase of 10%. If the performance function is Weighted Additive, Ruby prefers to gain a new unit of capability in Selling: this increases TSC from 6.20 to 6.90 (+11.3%), whereas a new unit of capability in Making increases TSC from 6.20 to 6.50 (+4.8%).
- INSERT TABLE A2 ABOUT HEREIn either of the multiplicative functions, Ruby prefers to gain a new unit of capability in
Making. Despite the fact that Ruby prioritizes Selling (priority = .7) over Making (priority = .3), and has more capability in Selling than Making, it should allocate resources to Making. In a multiplicative system, weak activities multiply through the performance system as a whole.
NOTES
i Averaging keeps the range of Total Strategic Capital within the 0 to 10 scale of the underlying capabilities. Thus, if the variables have values 6 and 8, the sum is 14, which is outside the 0 to 10 scale. Averaging the scores preserves the additive logic while making the scale more intuitive. ii Intuitively, an "additive mean" (or "arithmetic mean") implies that the two variables are perfect substitutes for each other (to raise the mean, it does not matter which variable is increased); a "geometric mean" implies that the two variables are not perfect substitutes (increasing the lower value gives a different mean than increasing the higher value). Arithmetically, the "additive mean" adds the values and divides by the number of values, and the "geometric mean" multiplies the values and raises them to an exponent equal to 1/(the number of values). If the two values are 8 and 2, the additive mean is (8+2)/2 = 5; the geometric mean is (8x2) ½ (square root of 16) = 4. G (3,1) .
If the company could gain six new units of capability, any point between A and B would be achievable. How should it apportion these units between Developing New Products and Serving Customers? In an Additive function, it does not matter: Goldenrod will achieve 10 total units of capability (TSC = 5.0) for any allocation on line segment AB.
A Multiplicative function is shown in the curve below. How should Goldenrod Company apportion six new units of capability? As before, any point on line segment AB is achievable. However, only one allocation -the allocation that takes them to point C -allows Goldenrod to achieve TSC = 5. Any other allocation places the company on a lower TSC curve.
To reach point C, Goldenrod must allocate two units to Developing new Products and four units to Serving Customers; then its capabilities in the two activities will be (5,5) and total strategic capital will be 5.
Resource allocations depend on the priorities of activities and the company's existing capabilities. Goldenrod's activities had equal priority, but its capabilities (3,1) were unequal. TSC could only be maximized by allocating more resources to the weaker capability. 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 
